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Abstract
The devastating effects of cyber-attacks, highlight the need for novel attack de-
tection and prevention techniques. Over the last years, considerable work has
been done in the areas of attack detection as well as in collaborative defense.
However, an analysis of the state of the art suggests that many challenges ex-
ist in prioritizing alert data and in studying the relation between a recently
discovered attack and the probability of it occurring again. In this article, we
propose a system that is intended for characterizing network entities and the
likelihood that they will behave maliciously in the future. Our system, namely
Network Entity Reputation Database System (NERDS), takes into account all
the available information regarding a network entity (e. g. IP address) to cal-
culate the probability that it will act maliciously. The latter part is achieved
via the utilization of machine learning. Our experimental results show that it is
indeed possible to precisely estimate the probability of future attacks from each
entity using information about its previous malicious behavior and other char-
acteristics. Ranking the entities by this probability has practical applications
in alert prioritization, assembly of highly effective blacklists of a limited length
and other use cases.
Keywords: network security, alert sharing, reputation database, attack
prediction, alert prioritization, machine learning
1. Introduction
With cyber-attacks increasing both in numbers and sophistication, a lot
of research has been done over the last years towards collaborative detection
mechanisms. Such research varies from sophisticated alert data correlation and
aggregation mechanisms to the construction of complex collaborative architec-
tures [1]. As a result, a plethora of alert sharing platforms and systems have
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been proposed1. Nevertheless, a more in-depth analysis of threat sharing plat-
forms and systems shows that a number of challenges need to be addressed
before such systems can be considered mature [1, 2].
First, we argue that one of the core issues is the large number of alerts, gen-
erated by the cybersecurity tools, an analyst deals with. This issue is amplified
when considering additional data received via various sharing and collaborative
platforms. In this context, data prioritization and summarization are essential
for reducing the overwhelming amount of information presented to the analyst.
Indeed, prioritization was identified as one of the most important parts of cyber
incident handling processes in several studies [3, 4].
Second, the reasoning behind exchanging alert data (as well as blacklisting)
usually comes with an implicit assumption that recently discovered attacks are
likely to be performed again in a similar manner or by the same attacker. How-
ever, this holds only for a certain set of attackers and attack types, while others
appear to be non-repetitive or even one time only. The analyst needs to be able
to effectively recognize in which set an attacker belongs to, in order to initiate
further actions that are relevant to the given set. For instance, the identification
of a persistent attacker leads to its automated blocking, while an one-time-only
attack, on a critical asset, leads to further investigation.
Third, there are numerous blacklists and other threat intelligence sources
as well as multiple alerts from security monitoring tools. Not only the volume
of information is high but some data are irrelevant or of low quality. While
collecting all relevant data is important for a detailed attack analysis, in other
cases it is important to be able to quickly comprehend the main properties of
the attacking source, so it is possible to easily or even automatically assess the
source behavior and decide about the appropriate immediate action.
We argue that a well designed method of summarizing all known information
about a malicious network entity can help to address the aforementioned issues.
To this end, in this article we propose a machine learning based algorithm
to estimate the probability that a particular entity (e.g. an IP address) will
repeat an attack in the near future. We call this probability estimation the
Future Misbehavior Probability (FMP) score. The score represents an aggregated
knowledge about each entity and it expresses its expected behavior; allowing
also for the comparison between entities. The previous works on scoring IP
addresses or networks lack some important properties (such as prediction of the
future behavior), only allow the assessment of whole networks, or cannot use
some important input features.
The score is a key enabler for several network security applications. Network
administrators can utilize it to prioritize the alert data they receive. For exam-
ple, it is common to utilize alert sharing platforms to be alerted on malicious
1Note that the state of the art utilizes a multitude of different terms to describe seman-
tically similar systems. Such terms include but are not limited to: Collaborative Intrusion
Detection Systems (CIDSs), collaborative intrusion detection networks, threat intelligence
sharing platforms, network telescopes, etc.
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hosts in the network. In such a use case, the administrator watches the alerts
shared by others and if the reported IP address belongs to her constituency, it
indicates there is a misbehaving (e.g. malware infected) host in the managed
network. Hence, the score supports the administrator’s decision process (i.e.
which IP address to deal with first), especially in large constituencies.
Besides alert prioritization, the score has practical applications in attack
mitigation and traffic analysis. A straightforward usage is to assemble entities
with the highest FMP score into a blacklist, which is then used to block network
traffic from these entities. Furthermore, the FMP score may serve indirectly as
one of the decision criteria in spam filters, DDoS mitigation devices or any
other algorithms recognizing malicious traffic by multiple criteria. In addition,
the existence of an FMP score also offers new possibilities of traffic analysis. For
example an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) may apply more detailed analysis
techniques (which would not scale for all the traffic) to the traffic belonging to
the highly-ranked entities.
At a glance, the main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We introduce the concept of an advanced reputation database system for
network entities to improve alert processing and prioritization.
• We propose a generic method for ranking network entities by a Future
Misbehavior Probability (FMP) score, a value that summarizes all known
information about an entity to express the level of threat it poses.
• We evaluate and compare different machine learning approaches and sets
of input features to identify the most efficient ones, with regard to the
specific application scenario of ranking malicious IP addresses. We also
evaluate how the FMP score can be utilized for creating predictive black-
lists.
The evaluation is based on millions of alerts from a real alert-sharing sys-
tem. The results show that the proposed method indeed creates a predictor
which is able to accurately estimate the probability of future attacks per each
evaluated IP address. Moreover, the predictor assigns scores smoothly over the
whole range between 0 and 1, rendering it well usable for ranking addresses and
prioritization. Our evaluation also demonstrates the advantage of having the
score assigned to each known malicious IP address when a blacklist of a limited
size needs to be created. The FMP score allows to create the most effective
blacklist possible for any given size.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the
state of the art in threat intelligence platforms and in methods of evaluating
reputation of network entities. Section 3 provides context to our scoring method
by presenting a general model of an alert processing system and introducing
the reputation database system NERDS. In Section 4, we describe in detail
the generic FMP score estimation algorithm. Subsequently, Section 5 provides
the evaluation of the scoring mechanism along with a comparison of different
machine learning models and evaluation of one of the possible uses of the score
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– generation of predictive blacklists. Lastly, Section 6 concludes this article and
outlines our future work plans.
2. Related work
Our work is related to existing threat intelligence platforms. A brief overview
of the platforms is provided in the following subsection. Subsequently, we com-
pare our work with recent research on various characteristics of malicious sources
and with the state-of-the-art approaches for evaluating reputation in the net-
work domain.
2.1. Threat intelligence platforms
Many platforms exist for cyber threat intelligence management and sharing
– both open and free as well as commercial ones. Examples of open platforms for
exchanging data about cyber threats and indicators of compromise are MISP [5],
Warden [6, 7], DShield2 and CIF3.
The Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) is an open source so-
lution for collection, storage, distribution and sharing of indicators and alerts
regarding cyber security incidents. The main goal of MISP is to share informa-
tion related to targeted attacks and malware. The features include a centralized
searchable data repository, a sharing mechanism based on defined trust groups,
and semi-anonymized discussion boards.
The Warden is an open source platform designed for automated sharing of
detected security events. It enables CERTs/CSIRTs (and security teams in
principle) to share as well as make use of information on detected attacks and
anomalies in networks or services as generated by different detectors – intrusion
detection system (IDS), honeypots, network probes, traffic logs, etc.
DShield is a platform for collection and analysis of incoming malicious activ-
ities detected by thousands of contributors. The contributing network operators
send alerts from packet filters like firewalls or IDS systems, DShield aggregates
and analyzes them and provides various statistics as well as blacklists of the
most dangerous networks on its website.
The Collective Intelligence Framework (CIF) is a cyber threat intelligence
management system, which allows to collect data, mostly indicators like IP ad-
dresses, FQDNs and URLs, from multiple sources. It allows to parse, normalize,
store, post process and query them and also to share them to others.
A list of commercial threat intelligence sharing and management platforms
includes, for example, SoltraEdge, IBM X-Force Exchange, Facebook Threat
Exchange, Alien Vault Open Threat Exchange and many others [8].
The term cyber threat intelligence is usually understood as a way to en-
compass high-level information, such as description of techniques and proce-
dures used by adversaries, information about malware or phishing campaigns,
2https://www.dshield.org/
3https://csirtgadgets.com/collective-intelligence-framework
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or global trends in different types of threats. Nevertheless, most of the existing
tools focus primarily on sharing of indicators of compromise, such as malicious
IP addresses, URLs or file hashes [8]. A recent user study [4] also agrees that de-
spite the significant growth of threat intelligence platforms in the last few years,
the most often used source of threat data are still classic blacklists (mostly lists
of malicious IP addresses and URLs).
These blacklists represent a trivial way to express reputation of network
entities. Although they are easy to use they do not offer granularity and details.
The information provided by blacklists is only binary – an entity is either listed
or not. There are usually no details describing the type, intensity or frequency
of malicious activities performed by the entity nor any score evaluating the
level of threat the entity poses or the confidence of its listing, which would
allow to sort or filter them. Such information would be very useful. Multiple
studies [4, 3] recognized the ability to prioritize threats and the ability to get
a comprehensive picture of the threat among the most important requirements
on threat intelligence. In this context, this article focuses on collecting detailed
information about the malicious network entities and on their scoring.
2.2. Evaluating reputation of network entities
This work builds on the knowledge of various characteristics of malicious
traffic sources. These characteristics has been studied in several previous works,
mostly in the context of IP addresses. In one such work Collins et al. [9] show
that devices in some networks are more prone to be compromised (e.g. infected
with malware) and cleaning up those devices takes longer than in other net-
works4. This network property is called uncleanliness and the authors propose
a method to quantify it using data about known malicious IP addresses from
different sources. The measures of spatial and temporal uncleanliness of differ-
ent networks are then used to predict which networks are likely to contain bots
or otherwise malicious addresses.
Shue et al. [10] presented a similar work which focuses on the analysis of
malicious autonomous systems (AS). By using data from several blacklists as
well as their own spam detection tools, authors show that some AS contain much
more malicious IP addresses than others. While in most cases it is probably
caused just by poor security policies in those networks, there are also AS with
more than 80 % of their address space blacklisted. Authors argue that these AS
are probably run only to host malicious activities.
The non-uniform distribution of malicious sources in the IP address space
was also studied in a series of works on the so called bad neighborhoods [11,
12, 13, 14], which is the term used for networks with high ratio of malicious
IP addresses. The authors propose to aggregate IP addresses listed on various
blacklists by their common prefix (usually of length /24) and create lists of pre-
fixes (networks) with too many blacklisted IP addresses. Such bad neighborhood
blacklists can then be used in spam filtering algorithms. In these works, authors
4Networks in this work are defined simply as IP prefixes of length /24.
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also analyze various characteristics of the bad neighborhoods. For example,
in [12] they show that in case of spam sources, only 10 % of the most active
neighborhoods (/24 prefixes) are responsible for more than half of all the spam
messages. In other works they show that the existence of bad neighborhoods
can also be observed in data about other types of malicious activity, like attacks
on SSH, but that the particular lists of malicious networks are different for each
type of such activity.
In a later work [15] Moura et al. undertook research into temporal charac-
teristics of the bad neighborhoods. Using several datasets about different types
of malicious activities, they found out that 40–95 % (depending on the dataset)
of bad neighborhoods repeat an attack against the same target within a few
days.
All the aforementioned works analyze the maliciousness of the whole net-
works, usually defined as groups of IP addresses with the same /24 prefix. Some
of them propose a score to rate the networks. Such scoring methods are usually
based on the number of blacklisted hosts in a network. Such an approach is
simple as it utilizes the spatial correlations among the malicious IP addresses.
However, the scoring of the whole networks represents certainly a significant
issue and limits its applicability. For example, in case of blocking the whole
network prefix many completely benign addresses are blocked.
There are also several works studying properties of malicious traffic sources
at the level of individual IP addresses. Zhang et al. [16] take 9 public blacklists
and analyze both temporal and spatial characteristics of their entries. They
show, for example, that the lists are changing quickly and that even the geo-
graphic distribution of malicious IP addresses around the world is highly non-
uniform. Another characteristics are shown in [17], where authors analyze lists
of IP addresses reported as malicious by various Google services. For example,
they show that 1 % of the most active malign IP addresses are responsible for
48–82 % of all attacks (depending on the service attacked). They also found
significant correlations between lists of addresses attacking different services,
i.e. in some cases a single address is used to attack multiple services. Similar
characteristics of behavior of malicious IP addresses are observed in other works,
such as Wahid’s work [18] or in our own previous work [19, 20].
Another set of works that inspired our method are those on the topic of
predictive blacklisting [21, 22]. These works propose methods to explicitly pre-
dict which malicious sources are likely to attack in a near future (in contrast to
classic blacklists, which only list those attacking in the past). The goal of the
proposed methods is to prepare a blacklist for each organization which contains
those sources that are the most likely to attack the organization network within
the next day. Zhang et al. [21] introduced the concept of creating these targeted
highly predictive blacklists and provided a method based on leveraging correla-
tions among sets of attackers targeting individual organizations. Subsequently,
Soldo et al. [22] presented a method that significantly improved the precision of
generated blacklists. It models the problem as a recommendation system which
combines several prediction methods.
Although the methods internally work with a ranking of attackers by their
6
Table 1: Comparison of previous methods for evaluating reputation of network entities.
granularity numerical predictive neighbor- other
score hoods data
Traditional blacklists yes no no no no
Scoring of networks [9, 11, 10] no yes no yes no
Predictive blacklisting [21, 22] no no yes yes no
MISP scoring [23] yes yes no no no
FMP score (this work) yes yes yes yes yes
probability of attacking the given target network, the only goal is to build a
blacklist of a predefined size (as a top-n list of such ranked attackers). There-
fore, there is no evaluation by a score with a well defined meaning. Moreover,
the attackers in these works are always whole /24 prefixes, not individual IP
addresses, so the same disadvantages stemming from low granularity, as those
described for network scoring methods above, apply as well.
A recently published paper [23] describes a work in progress on a method
for scoring individual IP addresses and other identifiers (so called indicators of
compromise) in the context of the MISP threat sharing platform. The score
is used to estimate whether an indicator is still relevant or not. It is based
on indicator observations, assigned tags and reliability of data sources. The
score of an indicator is reset to its maximum value every time an observation of
that indicator in the wild is reported and it decreases in time by a predefined
formula. When the score reaches zero, the indicator is marked as expired and
can be discarded. However, the work is still quite incomplete. For example,
the meaning of values between the maximum and zero is not defined, and the
method for evaluating source reliability has not been designed yet. Also, spatial
correlations among the neighboring IP addresses are not used in any way and
there is no attempt of explicit prediction of the future behavior.
Table 1 summarizes important aspects of the previous methods for evalu-
ating reputation in contrast to our FMP score. The high granularity column
shows if the score is assigned to each individual IP address, not just network
prefix or other large group of addresses. Numerical score expresses if there is
some numerical value assigned to each entity, or it is just a simple list pro-
viding only binary information about the entities (listed or not listed). The
predictive column depicts whether the method is based on explicit prediction
on future behavior of the evaluated entities or not. The neighborhood column
shows whether the method utilizes the correlations among neighboring IP ad-
dresses or not. The last column shows if the method is able to utilize any other
data than those regarding previously reported malicious activities.
The table shows that each of the previous works lacks some of these aspects.
Our proposed FMP score is the first non-binary evaluation of reputation of
individual network entities which is based on prediction of future attacks. For
the prediction, we consider not only the previous behavior of the evaluated
entity and its neighboring entities, but also other related information not directly
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derived from observed behavior.
3. Network Entity Reputation Database System (NERDS)
To provide context to our work, this section briefly introduces NERDS (Net-
work Entity Reputation Database System). NERDS stores information about
malicious network entities and summarizes the pieces of information into the
FMP score. NERDS is a component of a larger Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI)
infrastructure. As a particular example of the CTI infrastructure, we consider
an ecosystem of components which collect, analyze and react upon network
alerts depicted on Figure 1.
The network alerts are collected by an alert sharing component from a
plethora of network monitoring mechanisms, capable of detecting and report-
ing malicious network activities. For instance, from honeypots, IDSs, network
behavior analyzers, log analyzers, etc. We utilize the alert sharing unit as an
example input component, since alert sharing systems are becoming popular,
widely deployed, as well as they usually share a large amount of alerts from
diverse sources. At the same time they provide data normalization. Neverthe-
less, the alert sharing can be complemented or replaced by any other collection
component without affecting the presented approach (provided sufficient num-
ber of alerts is collected to allow for effective application of machine learning
techniques). The collected alerts are stored in an alert database. The database
offers a fast query interface to mine data in the stored alerts either by a user
from a user interface or automatically by an analysis component. The analysis
component extracts relevant information out of the alerts. Analysis results are
displayed to an expert (e.g. CSIRT/CERT) via a user interface, moreover, some
results are transformed into actions in the Action component such as trigger a
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) protection, issue an incident, notify an
operator.
While some pieces of information are straightforward to obtain from alerts,
for example by filtering and aggregation, some remain hidden deeper and a more
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework of an alert processing system with entity database
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sophisticated approach must be applied to receive satisfying results. We consider
NERDS as such an advanced analysis approach as it gathers available knowledge
about the history of observed network entities and predict their future behavior
based on this knowledge.
In more details, NERDS consists of two parts – the entity database and the
entity scoring. The entity database keeps a record for each entity (e.g. IP ad-
dress) reported as malicious by one or more of the alerts. The record not only
contains meta-data about the observed alerts but also additional relevant infor-
mation from various external sources to broaden the visibility of the behavior of
the entity in a more global scale. In case of IP addresses, the information kept
in records include, for example, resolved hostname, geo-location, autonomous
system number or occurrence of the IP address on several public blacklists.
While the entity database is a necessary prerequisite the entity scoring is the
core part of the advanced analysis. The entity scoring mechanism summarizes all
available information gathered per entity into a score and this score is assigned
per entity. The score represents a meaningful and actionable information that
is utilized by the action components, for example, to block traffic from most
offending IP addresses or domains, or by a user directly, for example, to prioritize
investigation of reported incidents or to bring attention to a prevailing issue. A
first idea of such a reputation database, including summarizing the data into a
single reputation score, has been briefly introduced in our earlier work [24]. In
this work we propose and evaluate a particular method which can be used in
the scoring component.
4. Future Misbehavior Probability (FMP) Estimation
One important element of NERDS is the scoring component, which estimates
the entity score based on all the stored knowledge about an entity. Since we
believe that a well-understood mechanism increases trust and utilization of the
score in real-world applications, we devote this section to a thorough description
of the estimation mechanism.
While our main motivation is scoring individual IP addresses, the formal
description of the method provided below is general to account for any kind
of network identifier that may be reported as malicious, e.g. an IP address, a
domain name, an autonomous system, etc. We narrow the generic concept into
a method for scoring IPv4 addresses in Section 5.
4.1. General Concept
At a glance, the input of the scoring component consists of two types of data,
(i) meta-data about the reported alerts related to the entity (and optionally to
its close neighborhood as well), and (ii) complementary, relevant third-party
security information related to the entity. Such complementary information
includes, for example, the hostname, the Autonomous System Number (ASN)
or the geo-location data of IP addresses, the domain name entropy or the date
of registration for domain names, information about the presence of an entity
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on public blacklists, etc. Both data types are stored and provided by the Entity
database which periodically gathers it from a multitude of sources.
An output of the scoring component is a number, which expresses the level
of threat (or maliciousness) the entity poses. We coin this as Future Misbehav-
ior Probability (FMP) score and we define the FMP score of an entity as the
estimated probability that the entity will behave maliciously in an upcoming time
interval (prediction window).
The score is, therefore, a result of prediction of future malicious activities
of the entities based on all the available information about the entity. We
propose to use a Machine Learning (ML) technique to derive a predictor since
(i) the amount of available information is large, (ii) the prediction model is not
straightforward to derive analytically and (iii) the predictor is expected to be
periodically adjusted to the characteristics of the latest data.
An ideal predictor, capable of predicting the future precisely, would only
assign FMP score of 1.0 or 0.0, depending on whether the entity behaves mali-
ciously or not in the prediction window. However, it is impossible to assemble
such a predictor in practice. That is, any real-world predictor is only able to
estimate the probability based on information available at the time of predic-
tion. Therefore, our goal is to design a high precision predictor, by the means
of minimizing the error of estimated probability over all entities.
Note, that in practice it is usually impossible to find out all malicious behav-
ior of an entity, since the predictor receives only the detected ones (via alerts
received from detection systems). As a result, it is only able to predict future
alerts related to the entity and not all actual attacks. The quality of the input
data in terms of accuracy and coverage has impact on the quality of prediction.
The better the input data, the more precise and useful is the FMP score. Nev-
ertheless, the principle of the scoring method is robust enough to work with low
quality data as well.
The FMP score may be general, predicting any kind of malicious network
behavior, or specific to a particular type of activity. For example, there may be
an FMP score in the context of DDoS attacks and a different one in the context
of port scans, each estimating probability of different types of behavior. It is
also possible to compute the FMP score for specific targets, e.g. for specific
networks or types of services. When it is needed to distinguish multiple such
FMP scores, an index is used, e.g. FMP scan. In the rest of this section, we will
not differentiate between these variants, since the only difference is in what is
considered a malicious behavior that should be predicted.
The length of the prediction window should conform to the particular appli-
cation use case. The longer time preference the application has the longer the
window. There can be applications requiring both short and long-term expec-
tation of entity’s behavior separately, thus multiple windows lengths must be
predicted in parallel. In this work, we consider 24-hour prediction window as a
medium length that satisfies majority of applications (which is also in line with
the previous works [21, 22]).
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4.2. Formal definition
The main input of the method are alerts reporting malicious activity of some
entities. Alerts may have different formats and contain various information, but
for the purpose of our work, we assume that each alert contains at least: (i)
time of detection, t, and (ii) identification of the entity reported as source of the
event5 (e.g. source IP address), e. Preferably, it should also contain: (iii) type
or category of the event, c, (iv) event volume, v (its exact meaning depends on
the event type, e.g. a number of connection attempts), and (v) identification of
the detector, d. In the following text, we assume that alerts contain all these
five attributes, but the method may be applied, with some limitations, utilizing
only the first two as well.
An alert can therefore be defined as a tuple a = (t, e, c, v, d). A set of all
alerts available is denoted as A. The time at which the prediction is computed
(current time or prediction time) is marked as t0. The prediction window, Tp,
is the time window of length wp immediately following t0, Tp = (t0, t0 + wp).
The predictor uses information about the past alerts from a history window,
Th = (t0 − wh, t0), where wh is the history window length.
For a given prediction time t0, a feature vector xe,t0 = (x1, x2, ..., xk)e,t0 is
computed for each entity e. The feature vector consists of various alert-based
features, computed from alerts received within the history window, and the non-
alert features, extracted from other available information related to the entity
at t0 (see Section 4.3 for further discussion of features).
The output to be predicted (class label), ye,t0 , is binary; depicting whether
or not there is an alert reporting the entity within the prediction window:
ye,t0 =
{
1 if ∃a ∈ A : a = (t, e, ·, ·, ·), t ∈ Tp
0 otherwise
(1)
If an FMP score in some context is to be computed, the condition above
becomes more restrictive, e.g. the alert category must match a given value.
Samples with ye,t0 = 1 are said to belong to the positive class, the others form
the negative class.
Now, the task is to create an estimator which, for a given feature vector xe,t0 ,
is able to accurately estimate the probability that ye,t0 = 1, i.e. that the entity
will be reported as malicious in the prediction window. This task is known as
binary class probability estimation problem in the machine learning community.
That is basically a binary classification problem where we are not interested in
final class assignments but rather in the probability of each class.
Output of the estimator is denoted as yˆe,t0 and represents the estimated
probability of the positive class given the feature vector,
yˆe,t0 ≈ p(ye,t0 = 1|xe,t0). (2)
5 In case an alert contains multiple sources it can be replaced by multiple alerts with a
single source and equally distributed volume.
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To create the estimator we follow the common supervised machine learning
process. First, we create an annotated dataset. Each sample in the dataset
describes a particular entity at a particular time. We select one or more time
instances in which the features are computed. We denote the set of these sample
times as Ts = t1, ..., tm. A pair of feature vector and class label, (xe,t0 , ye,t0),
is then computed for each entity e ∈ E at each sample time t0 ∈ Ts, creating
a dataset of |E × Ts| samples. From now on, we will index the samples of the
dataset by i for more concise notation.
The dataset is then randomly split into a training and a testing set and the
first one is used to train the model6.
The metric suitable for training and evaluating the model in this type of
problem is the Brier Score (BS). In our binary case, with classes labeled 0 and
1, the BS can be described as a mean squared difference of predicted probability
of the positive class and value of the real class:
BS =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(yˆi − yi)2, (3)
where N is the number of samples. The BS takes values between 0 and 1.
Lower values signify a more accurate prediction.
After the model is trained and its performance is acceptable, it is used to
assign FMP scores to new samples of network entities. For each new entity
to be evaluated, a feature vector is computed from all related alerts and other
available information, and it is passed to the trained model. Its output, yˆ, is
then directly used as the FMP score,
FMP(e, t0) = yˆe,t0 (4)
A change in behavior of malicious entities as well as in the configuration
of detectors influence the characteristics of alerts. Therefore, the model should
be re-trained on new data whenever the performance of the predictor decreases
below a defined threshold.
If multiple FMP scores for different contexts are required (e.g. for different
types of network attacks), a separate model must be trained for each such
context using different training data. Samples in the training data are labeled as
positive class (yi = 1) only when there is an alert of given type in the prediction
window, alerts of other types are ignored (samples have yi = 0). Nevertheless,
the input features still contain information about all types, since there may be
correlations between different attack types that can be exploited by the predictor
(e.g. login attempts are often preceded by port scans [25, 20], so information
about scans can be used to improve prediction accuracy of login attempts). Of
6 We do not recommend any particular model in this generic part. Usually multiple models
with various configurations need to be tested and the one performing the best in the particular
application is chosen.
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course, information about different attack types should be treated as different
features.
4.3. Feature selection guidelines
As already noted, a feature vector for our scoring method generally consists
of two types of features: (i) the features based on previous alerts related to
the entity or similar entities (e.g. nearby IP addresses), and (ii) the features
based on other data sources than alerts (e.g. presence of the entity on a public
blacklist).
The particular set of features needs to be designed specifically for each class
of entities and according to the input data available. However, at least for
the alert-related features, we provide basic guidelines and examples that we
expect to work well in most cases. We propose the utilization of the following
characteristics as the basis for alert related features:
• Number of alerts
• Total volume of reported attacks
• Number of distinct detectors reporting alerts
• Time since last alert
• Average and median of intervals between alerts within the history window
The first three characteristics can be computed per different time intervals
(e.g. the last day and whole history window), each interval resulting in a sepa-
rate feature. Another approach is to create time-series of these numbers (e.g. a
number of alerts in each day over the history window) and use the Exponentially
Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) of the time-series as a feature. EWMA,
which is often used as a simple, yet effective, predictor of the next value in a
time-series, can be defined as:
x¯t = αxt + (1− α)x¯t−1, (5)
where xt is value of the time-series at time interval t and α ∈ (0, 1) is a
smoothing factor, higher values mean more weight is given to recent samples,
low values give more weight to older history.
In addition, since we are interested primarily in whether or not there will be
an alert in the prediction window, not in the number of alerts or total volume,
it is useful to use EWMA of a binary variant of the time-series, which contains
1 if there are any alerts in a given day, 0 when there is none.
When the aforementioned features are computed only from alerts reporting
the given entity, they only capture temporal characteristics of the entity behav-
ior. If spatial correlations are expected for the given type of entity, i.e. the
behavior of nearby or otherwise similar entities is correlated, an additional set
of features can be computed to allow to leverage these correlations. This set of
features is the same as those above, but it counts alerts related to any of the
13
neighboring entities instead of just the evaluated entity itself. For example, in
case of IP addresses, the same set of features can be computed for IP address
itself and for the whole /24 prefix it belongs to.
Finally, some of the features reach very high values (e.g. number of alerts or
their total volume) which is not handled well by some machine learning models.
Moreover, it is usually not important whether there was 1000 or 1001 alerts, but
1 or 2 alerts are a big difference, although the arithmetic difference is the same.
It is therefore recommended to use a log-like nonlinear transformation on most
of the features, which reduces the high values while keeping small differences in
small values still significant. In particular, we recommend to use log(x+1) for all
features meaning a number of something. For features describing time intervals,
exp(−x) should be used instead to avoid a problem on infinite intervals in case
there is no previous alert. The function maps infinity to 0 and short intervals
to values close to 1, which also makes it consistent with other features that are
zero for previously unseen entities and higher for highly active ones.
4.4. Unbalanced data and recalibration
Many machine learning models exhibit poor performance when the input
data are highly unbalanced, i.e. when numbers of samples in each class differ
significantly. We expect this will be the case in most applications of our method,
since the entities actually detected as malicious within the prediction window
will be just a small fraction among all evaluated entities. Therefore, there will
be significantly more samples of negative class than those of positive class.
Generally, there are two main approaches to balance a dataset. A simple
and commonly used one is to subsample the majority class. The other one is to
supersample the minority class, either by duplicating the minority samples, or
by creating new artificial samples near the original ones (SMOTE [26]). Super-
sampling is more complicated and introduces some drawbacks, so it is usually
chosen only when the dataset is so small that there would be too few samples
left for training after subsampling. This is however not our case. It is usually
not an issue to acquire millions of alerts, so we use the subsampling approach.
Subsampling should only be applied on the training dataset, the testing
one should retain the original distribution. However, this violates the basic
machine learning assumption that the training and testing datasets follow the
same distribution, resulting in skewed probability estimates (see [27] for detailed
discussion). Fortunately, as shown in [27], this skew can be easily recalibrated
by transforming the output of the model learned on subsampled data, yˆs, by
the following formula:
yˆ =
βyˆs
βyˆs − yˆs + 1 , (6)
where β = N
+
N− and N
+, N− represent the number of samples of positive
and negative class, respectively, in the original dataset (assuming negative class
is the majority one).
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Alternatively, if an implementation of the selected machine learning model
allows weighting of samples, it is possible to set weight of all negative samples
to β instead of subsampling. However, in the evaluation below, we use the sub-
sampling approach with recalibration as it means smaller dataset and therefore
faster training while results are almost the same.
5. Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the general scoring mechanism (introduced in
Section 4) by applying it on real data about network alerts. In particular,
we consider a system as described in Section 3 which receives alerts from var-
ious network security tools. Its NERDS subsystem stores information about
reported IPv4 addresses and assigns the FMP score to each address based on
the estimated probability of receiving another alert related to the same address
within the next day. Our goal is to shed light on how the scoring mechanism is
deployed, to confirm and quantify the assumption of repetetive offenders and to
show prediction results under various settings. Last but not least, we elaborate
a practical application of FMP score – building predictive blacklists for blocking
traffic of IP addresses with the highest probability of being malicious.
5.1. Source of data
The data used for evaluation come from the Warden system – an alert sharing
tool and community run by CESNET (NREN of the Czech republic). The
alerts are JSON messages reporting on various types of network attacks or other
security events. The attacks and events are detected by various monitoring
tools (honeypots, netflow analysis systems, IDS, etc.) deployed in CESNET
and several other networks. Each alert contains information about at least the
time of the event, its attack category, source IP address(es), identification of
the detector and usually also some measure of attack intensity, like number
of connection attempts. It therefore satisfies all the requirements stated in
Section 4.2.
5.2. Evaluation setting
Based on a statistical analysis and our previous experience with the data
(see e.g. a technical report [19]), we decided to set the length of the history
window, wh, to 7 days. The length of the prediction window, wp, is 1 day.
Therefore, we are going to estimate probability of receiving an alert about a
particular IP address within the next 24 hours, given information about alerts
from the previous week.
5.2.1. Dataset preparation
For the evaluation, we took three months worth of data from Warden, from
September to November 2017. In total, the dataset consists of 155 million alerts
about 5.3 million IP addresses, reported by 23 different sources. The alerts
report different types of malicious traffic (attack category) and the vast majority
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of them are various types of scanning activity, dictionary attacks or exploit
attempts. For the evaluation, we group the alerts into two broad categories –
port scans (scan) and unauthorized access attempts (both dictionary attacks
and exploit attempts, access). Therefore for each IP address two FMP scores
are computed – FMP scan predicting alerts of the scan category, and FMPaccess
predicting alerts of the access category. Other attack types, such as DDoS
attacks, are reported to Warden only occasionally and are disregarded in this
work.
We create the dataset by regurarly sampling the entity database at 24 differ-
ent prediction times (t0) within the three months. At each time t0, we account
for only IP addresses that are reported by at least one alert (of given type)
within the history window Th of one week
7. For each such an IP address, a
feature vector xi is computed and a class label yi is assigned.
We therefore only consider the addresses that has already been reported and
the score thus evaluates the probability they will be reported again. Theoreti-
cally, it is possible to estimate the probability of new occurrence of previously
unseen addresses as well, using information from alerts about other addresses in
the same prefix, maliciousness of the ASN and country, and the supplementary
features not based on alerts, but such scenario is not evaluated in this paper 8.
In total, we got 12.3 million samples related to scan alerts (the scan dataset),
765,000 samples related to access alerts (the access dataset).
From each dataset, a random subset of samples is put aside as testing data
(600,000 in scan dataset, 100,000 in access dataset). The rest is used for train-
ing9.
5.2.2. Features
The set of input features computed from the alerts observed in the history
window is selected according to the general guidelines presented in Section 4.3.
For each alert category (scan and access) the following features are computed
for each IP address (taking into account alerts reporting the given IP address):
1. Number of alerts in the last day
2. Total number of connection attempts (attack volume) in the last day
3. Number of detectors reporting the address in the last day
4. Number of alerts in the last week
5. Total number of connection attempts (attack volume) in the last week
6. Number of detectors reporting the address in the last week
7Please note that the history windows partially overlap
8If scoring of previously unseen addresses is needed, we recommend to build a separate
model for it. It would be hard to train a single one for both cases due to the extreme
imbalance in numbers of addresses observed and not observed in the history window (there
are 232 IP addresses and just a few millions are known as malicious). Moreover, the model for
unobserved addresses can be much simpler, as it can drop some of the input features, which
are always zero for such addresses.
9 We keep the training datasets large compared to the test ones since they will be heavily
subsampled in the next phase.
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7. EWMA of number of alerts per day over the last week
8. EWMA of total number of connection attempts per day over the last week
9. EWMA of a binary signal expressing presence of an alert (0 or 1) in each
day over the last week
10. Time from the last alert (in days)
11. Average interval between alerts within the last week (in days, infinity if
less then two alerts were reported)
12. Median of intervals between alerts within the last week (in days, infinity
if less then two alerts were reported)
In order to leverage spatial correlations (i.e. the observation that the mali-
cious IP addresses are often close to each other in IP address space), a similar
set of features is also computed by taking into account all alerts related to the
same /24 prefix as the evaluated IP address. This prefix set contains features
1–9 from the previous list and also two new ones:
• Number of distinct IP addresses in the prefix reported in the last day
• Number of distinct IP addresses in the prefix reported in the last week
Because there exist significant correlations between scan events and access
attempts, we always use features computed from both scan and access alert
categories (as separate feature sets), regardless of which alert category is to be
predicted.
Another two features utilize data about autonomous system numbers (ASN)
and geo-location data. As shown in multiple previous works (see Sec. 2), the
portion of malicious IP addresses in different countries and ASNs differ sig-
nificantly. For each IP address, we determine into which country and ASN it
belongs and use the corresponding maliciousness rates as input features. The
rate is computed as the number of known malicious IP addresses (i.e. those
with at least one alert in the last week) in that country or ASN divided by total
number of addresses assigned to that country or ASN.
In total there are 48 alert-based features.
These features are complemented by several features not based on alerts. All
of them are binary, taking a value of 1 if given condition is met, 0 otherwise.
First, presence of the IP address on 5 public blacklists10, and a list of dynamic
IP ranges11 is checked. Next a hostname associated with the IP address is
discovered via a DNS query and several hand-written rules are applied to it.
For example, we search for keywords like “static”, “dynamic”, “dsl”, or look if
the IP address is encoded in the hostname. This results in another 4 features.
All this information is gathered shortly before the prediction time t0. The
reason for estimating whether the IP address is dynamically assigned or not is
10UCEPROTECT, blocklist.de-SSH and Spamhaus PBL, PBL-ISP, XBL-CBL; we also
checked several others, but there are almost no overlap in IP addresses with our dataset,
which renders them useless for the estimator.
11SORBS DUL
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the expectation that the host behind a dynamic address may change soon after
the attack was detected, which intuitively lowers the expectation of repeating
attacks from such addresses.
In total, a vector of 58 features is computed for each IP address and predic-
tion time.
5.2.3. Preprocessing
The data in both datasets are highly imbalanced. Only 16.5 % samples be-
long to positive class in scan data, in access data it is only 8.1 %. We therefore
apply subsampling of majority class (the not-detected one, yi = 0) on the train-
ing dataset as described in Section 4.4. This results in 3.88 million training
samples in scan dataset and 107,000 samples in access dataset.
Next, values of most features are non-linearly transformed as described in
section 4.3. Features expressing number of alerts, connections or detectors are
transformed by log(x + 1). Features expressing time intervals are transformed
by exp(−x). Other features are numbers between 0 and 1 or binary tags and
do not need any transformation.
5.3. Model fitting
Subsampled and transformed training data are then passed to a machine
learning model to train. The goal is to minimize the Brier score, i.e. to estimate
the probability of the positive class with smallest average error over all samples.
Models are trained separately for scan and access data.
Finally, the test dataset is passed to each trained model to get the estimated
probability of positive class for each sample. These estimations are transformed
by the recalibration formula 6 and then the results are evaluated.
5.4. Predictor evaluation
First, we show performance of various machine learning models, then we
evaluate impact of various sets of features to see if and how much each of them
improves the results.
5.4.1. Machine learning models
After an initial study and experimenting with various machine learning
methods we identified neural networks (NN) and gradient boosted decision trees
(GBDT) as the most promising ones. We evaluated many variants of NNs with
up to three hidden layers and several configurations of GBDTs (we used the
xgBoost implementation [28]). Table 2 shows Brier scores of some of the models
for both datasets.
The neural networks have 2 or 3 fully connected hidden layers, each with
58 nodes (the number of input features) and rectified linear unit (ReLU) as the
activation function. The output layer is a single node with sigmoid activation.
We also tried different numbers of nodes and activation functions but the results
were very similar or worse than the results presented in this Section.
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Table 2: Brier score of different models over testing set of scan and access datasets
scan access
NN, 2 layers 0.0646 0.0549
NN, 3 layers 0.0646 0.0542
GBDT(100, 3) 0.0671 0.0529
GBDT(200, 7) 0.0628 0.0507
The GBDT models consist of 100 or 200 trees with maximum depth of 3
or 7, respectively. We tried other combinations as well and the results are not
surprising – Brier score slowly gets better as model complexity increases but at
the same time the training time increases significantly.
The training time on the scan dataset, using 2 CPU cores of an average
laptop, takes around 1 hour with GBDT(200, 7) model, while it is below 15
minutes with the simpler GBDT model and the NN based models (training on
access dataset is finished within a minute for all the models, because the dataset
is much smaller).
All Brier scores in Table 2 are close to zero, meaning a good precision of
probability estimation.
A crucial requirement on the FMP score is that it actually approximates
the probability of encountering another alert from the same address. While
this characteristic is already covered by the Brier score, it is also possible to
illustrate is visually. Figures 2 and 3 show probability calibration curves of
all the four models over both datasets. These curves (sometimes also called
reliability curves) show the distribution of real classes within bins of samples
with similar estimated probability of a particular class (the positive one in our
case), yˆi. In other words, samples are binned by their value of yˆi and for each
bin a point is drawn. Its horizontal position is given by the mean of yˆi within
the bin, vertical position is equal to the fraction of samples within the bin whose
true class is positive (yi = 1). If the estimator works well, i.e. its output indeed
approximates the probability of positive class, this fraction should be close to
the mean of the bin, and thus the resulting line should be close to the diagonal
(y = x).
We can see that all models perform very well on the scan dataset. It is
slightly worse on access dataset, especially at higher values of yˆ (approx. be-
tween 0.5 and 0.9). From the histogram below the calibration curves, which
shows the number of samples in each bin, we can see that the number of sam-
ples in this range is quite low. This is mostly because access alerts are an order
of magnitude less common in our dataset than scan alerts. Nevertheless, the
curves are still quite close to the ideal line so we consider estimations of all the
models as usable.
To illustrate the importance of recalibration by formula 6, we also show how
the calibration curves look like before the formula is applied – showed as dashed
lines in Figures 2 and 3. In such case the estimators are highly biased and
the estimated probability does not match the real one. For example, when the
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Figure 2: Probability calibration curve of 4 different models over the scan test dataset.
Figure 3: Probability calibration curve of 4 different models over the access test dataset.
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uncalibrated estimator outputs 0.6, the curve shows there is only about 20 %
chance of seeing an alert within the prediction window, contrary to the expected
60 % chance.
In many use cases the FMP score will be used together with a threshold
(either a fixed value or got by a top-n approach) to split IP addresses into
“good” and “bad” ones, e.g. to generate a blacklist. This reduces our binary
class probability estimation problem into binary classification.
It is important to note that the primary goal of our method is not to cre-
ate a perfect classifier, as the input data are surely not sufficient for accurate
prediction. This is because behavior of malicious actors is affected by many
factors not known to the model, including such things like random selection of
targets in automated scans or attacks. Therefore, in most cases it is only pos-
sible to estimate the probability – which is our main goal and we evaluated it
above. Nevertheless the metrics used for evaluating binary classification tasks
are generally well understood and can provide further insight into the model
performance.
A common way to visualize results of a binary classification is using Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves. These are shown for the evaluated
models in Figures 4 and 5. An ROC curve shows the trade-off between false
positive and true positive rates as the value of the threshold changes. In our case,
true positives are the addresses classified as “bad” (i.e. blacklisted) which are
then indeed reported as malicious within the prediction window, false positives
are those which are not. The closer the curve gets to the upper-left corner, the
better is the classifier.
All the curves are quite smooth and very similar to each other. The only
significant difference is between the datasets, where scan alerts appear to be
more easily predictable than access alerts. For example, when the threshold is
set to achieve 10 % false positive rate, we can capture over 80 % of recurring
scanners. Recall we only included IP addresses that were already reported
within the history window. Also note that false positive here does not necessarily
mean blacklisting a legitimate IP address, the address may still be malicious,
just not attacking any of the monitored networks within the prediction window.
Therefore, it may be just a wasted entry in the blacklist. This enables us to
move the threshold to the area of high false positive rates, allowing to block
almost all recurring attackers without a significant impact on legitimate traffic.
The only cost is a long blacklist. More detailed evaluation of the blacklist use
case is presented in Section 5.5.
Overall, by Brier scores, calibration plots and ROC curves, all evaluated
models perform very similarly, GBDT being usually slightly better. Therefore,
all further evaluation is performed with only a single model – GBDT(200, 7).
5.4.2. Feature sets
To see whether all features are indeed useful for prediction, we evaluate the
selected model with different sets of input features. Every time, the model is
trained and tested on the same datasets as in the previous section, just with
some of the features removed from feature vectors. The resulting ROC curves
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Figure 4: ROC curve of 4 different models over the scan test dataset after recalibration.
Figure 5: ROC curve of 4 different models over the access test dataset after recalibration.
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Figure 6: ROC curves of different sets of input features (scan dataset).
Figure 7: ROC curves of different sets of input features (access dataset).
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are shown in Figures 6 and 7. The basis is formed by the features computed from
alerts of the same category as the one predicted and only about the evaluated
address (i.e. not other addresses in the same prefix). These features, labeled
same cat., are always enabled. We can see that even these basic features provide
quite good results on both datasets. Another four curves show performance of
the model when different sets of features are added to the base one: features
computed from alerts related to IP addresses in the same /24 prefix (labeled as
prefix ), features computed from alerts of the other category (other cat.), features
evaluating rates of malicious IP addresses in the given country and ASN, and
the complementary data not related to alerts (i.e. presence on blacklists and
hostname-based tags, labeled here as tags). Finally, the last curve shows the
performance when all these feature sets are enabled (i.e. the same as presented
in the previous section).
We can observe that all feature sets have measurable effect on the results,
although sometimes very small. The least useful seems to be the other category
set of features in scan dataset. That means the alerts of the access category
are not relevant for prediction of scan alerts. This can be easily explained by
the fact that most scanners in our dataset are never reported as performing
access attempts, both because of the character of these attacks (most of access
attackers also performs scans, but not all scanners try to access the scanned
devices) and the overall disparity in the number of alerts of those categories in
our dataset. Indeed, when we look at ROC curves of the access dataset, the
alerts of the other category (i.e. scan) improves the results very significantly.
A similar but reverse effect can be observed with the prefix features. Ad-
dition of features computed from alerts of the whole /24 prefix improves the
results significantly in the scan dataset, but there is only minor improvement
in the access dataset. We explain this by the lower number of access attack
sources in our dataset, which means there is a lower chance of observing many
such addresses in the same prefix, so the predictor can rarely use this type of
correlation.
Another set of features utilizing spatial correlations, the ones based on geo-
location and ASN data, show almost the same effect as the prefix features on
the scan dataset. On the access dataset, they provide slightly better results,
probably because the grouping of addresses based on country and ASN provides
much larger groups than /24 prefixes, so there is higher chance there are multiple
attacking addresses in the same group.
The last set of features are the tags obtained from supplementary, non-alert
data. We can see that in both cases presence of these features improves the
results significantly. Unsurprisingly, combination of all the features provides
better results than any of the feature sets alone. Overall, we can conclude that
all of the feature sets prove to be useful.
5.5. Using FMP score to create predictive blacklists
In this section we evaluate one of the possible use cases of the scoring method
– generating blacklists of a user defined size. In this use case a list of IP addresses
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Figure 8: Blacklist size as a function of threshold value applied on FMP score. Each line
corresponds to the blacklist generated for one of the three days.
with the highest FMP score (a blacklist) is created at the end of each day and
used to block traffic12 from these addresses during the next day.
The size and restrictiveness of the blacklist can be controlled by the user
– either by taking a fixed number of the worst IP addresses, or taking all IP
addresses with FMP score greater than a fixed threshold. Assuming the proba-
bility estimation is accurate, it is guaranteed that such blacklist has the highest
hit count possible with the given length of the list. Following [21, 22], we de-
fine hit count as the number of IP addresses on the blacklist that are correctly
predicted, i.e. the IP is indeed detected and reported by an alert within the
prediction window. We also define hit rate, which is hit count divided by the
size of the list.
In this section we evaluate the effectiveness of blacklists generated using
FMP scores.
We took data from three days in the first half of December 2017, i.e. shortly
after the data used for training. For each day, we computed feature vectors of all
addresses reported within the previous week and assigned them FMP score using
the estimator trained in the previous section (GBDT(200,7) with all features).
Then, we generated a list of IP addresses for each day, sorted by FMP score in
decreasing order. Blacklists are generated from these lists by taking the first N
entries or all entries with FMP score greater than or equal to a fixed threshold.
Figure 8 shows the relationship between the threshold and the size of the list
for each of the days and datasets.
Further, we only use the access dataset, since unauthorized access attempts
are more severe events than ordinary scans and it makes more sense to block
12Or apply rate limiting or any other restrictive measures, depending on user’s needs.
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Table 3: Hit count, hit rate and fraction of attackers blocked by blacklists of different sizes
N blacklist T hit count hit rate % of attackers
FMP 0.99 100 100 % 2.3 %
100 GWOL1 – 83 83 % 1.9 %
GWOL7 – 71 71 % 1.6 %
FMP 0.68 443 89 % 10.1 %
500 GWOL1 – 236 47 % 5.4 %
GWOL7 – 233 47 % 5.3 %
FMP 0.18 862 43 % 19.7 %
2000 GWOL1 – 650 33 % 14.9 %
GWOL7 – 579 29 % 13.2 %
388444 uceprotect – 463 0.12 % 10.6 %
8063 bl.de-ssh – 336 4.2 % 7.2 %
1503 bfb – 70 4.7 % 1.6 %
them or apply some strict rules on the related traffic.
We evaluate hit count of FMP-based blacklists of different sizes N and com-
pare them to blacklists created in a more traditional way.
As a baseline we created blacklists from the same data (i.e. alerts from
Warden) but using a basic method – listing the most active attackers reported
by all the detectors contributing to the alert sharing system within a history
window (called GWOL, global worst offender list, in [21, 22]). We generate these
lists using two different lengths of the history window, one day (GWOL1) and
7 days (GWOL7). Similarly to our approach, the GWOL lists can be generated
with any number of entries, so we always compare an FMP-based list and GWOL
of the same length.
We also compare these lists with three real third-party blacklists, namely
UCEPROTECT, blocklist.de–SSH (bl.de-ssh) and BruteForceBlocker13 (bfb).
These lists have fixed size and are based on different input data.
Table 3 shows performance of all the blacklists. The FMP-based and GWOL
blacklists are generated by taking top N IP addresses, for N being 100, 500 and
2000. The column labeled as T shows which FMP threshold corresponds to
given size of the blacklist. In other words, the list contains all IP addresses with
FMPaccess ≥ T . The hit count column shows the number of addresses attacking
in a given day that would be blocked by the blacklist (number of hits). Hit rate
is simply hit count divided by N . It shows proportion of the blacklist that was
indeed used to block some attacks. All numbers in the table are averages over
the three days.
Generally, smaller blacklists have higher hit rate, which is expected since
they contain IP addresses with the highest probability of future alerts (or most
active ones in the past in case of GWOL). The FMP-based blacklist with 100
13http://danger.rulez.sk/index.php/bruteforceblocker/
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entries is especially efficient as all of the listed addresses indeed attacked in two
of the days, in the third it was 99. In all cases, the FMP-based blacklists are
significantly more efficient than any of the GWOL ones by means of hit count
and hit rate.
On average, there were 4,376 distinct attacking IP addresses in each day. The
last column shows how many of these attackers were blocked by each blacklist.
There it is important to note that around 60 % of attackers in each day are
“new”, i.e. they has never been detected in the previous week, so their at-
tacks are almost impossible to predict. Achievable maximum of the fraction of
predicted attackers is therefore 40 %. None of the blacklists get close to this
maximum, but still, the FMP blacklists are significantly better than the others.
The third-party blacklists prove to be very inefficient by means of hit rate,
as only a small portion of listed addresses are observed by detectors in Warden.
This is given by different sources of data used to build these blacklists, so they
also list many attackers that do not target any of the networks contributing to
Warden. Nevertheless, if large size of a blacklist is not an issue, these lists can
be used to complement the FMP-based one. Indeed, a combined list of FMP-
based list thresholded at 0.5 (689 entries) and the three third-party blacklists
(397250 entries in total) can block 24.2 % of attacks. However, the hit rate is
only 0.26 %, meaning that vast majority of entries are unused. Also, too large
blacklists increase the chance of blocking a legitimate traffic, so the smaller,
more efficient FMP-based blacklists may be preferred in many cases.
6. Conclusion
In this article, we introduce the Network Entity Reputation Database System
(NERDS), a system that is intended for being part of CIDSs and collaborative
defenses to assist with the prediction of future attacks and with prioritizing the
alert data. We defined the Future Misbehavior Probability (FMP), a score that
evaluates network entities by predicting their future behavior, and proposed a
method to create the predictor by utilizing the machine learning techniques.
Evaluation of the predictor on a real dataset, containing two types of alerts
reporting malicious IP addresses, demonstrates that our proposed method is
effective. Additionally, the FMP score can be used both for ranking IP addresses
(enables alert prioritization) as well as for predicting a set of addresses, that will
most probably attack on the next day. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the
FMP score can be used to generate predictive blacklists. Their efficiency is
measured as the number of listed attackers relative to blacklist size. Our results
show that FMP-assisted blacklists clearly outperform the traditional ones.
Another possible use case, evaluated in a separate work [29], is using FMP
score of suspicious IP addresses as one of the criteria for separating malicious
and legitimate traffic in a DDoS mitigation algorithm. In this method, traffic
from IP addresses with high FMP score have higher chance to get blocked during
a DDoS attack.
With regard to future work, we are currently introducing NERDS and the
FMP score into PROTECTIVE, a system for cyber threat intelligence sharing
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and analysis being developed by a consortium of 10 academic and commercial
partners from Europe. We are also exploring a possibility of combining the
FMP score, as an indicator of malicious activities, with information about nor-
mal traffic in a network (from NetFlow data) to improve the precision of the
blacklists and lower the chance of blocking a legitimate traffic. Lastly, we plan
to try to use deep learning methods to further improve the prediction. Some
of these methods could allow to predict not only probability of future alerts,
but also some of their parameters, like type of attack, expected intensity, or the
target.
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